Evolutionary Development of the Foundations of Taiwan Independence and Its Future Trend

　　Peng Weixue

　　

　　Taiwan independence secessionist forces, over their 60-year evolutionary development, and especially in the last 20 years in which the administrations of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, emanating their baneful influence in pursuit of their independence agenda, have become the major threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. They constitute an impediment to strategic opportunities and damage the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Furthermore, both internal and external factors may render problematic the prospect of any imminent collapse of Taiwan independence in coming years. However, as China’s overall national strength steadily grows and the power of the concept of peace permeates people’s hearts, those on the island will gradually turn toward the notion of “retreating from independence and moving toward unification.” More and more people will support the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Thus the foundations for Taiwan independence will gradually erode.

　　Before 2005, the overall aspect of these societal foundations manifested only slow expansion.

　　From the emergence of Taiwan independence in the mid-1940s to today, its foundations have developed in four phases: the inception phase (1945-1985), a period of strength (1986-2000), a period of development (2000-2004) and the lattermost, relatively weak period (2005-present). With the development of the Taiwan independence movement, the foundations for independence have constantly grown. The percentage of votes obtained by the independence camp increased by about 20% in the non-party period to 30%, just before the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) came to power. After achieving power, the percentage of votes the Pan-Green coalition maintained in various elections ranged from 41% to 51%. The increase of their votes in the legislature and in elections is one prime indicator of the foundations of independence.

　　Before 2005, at the same time the foundations of independence were gradually expanding, it structure was optimizing. First, the class foundation of the independence forces comprised a middle class core, with some permeation by the working and agrarian classes on the one hand, and the upper bourgeoisie on the other. The number of Pan-Green supporters from different class backgrounds was increasing. Second, the ethnic make-up of the forces consists in the main of Taiwan Hokkienese people , with gradual penetration by Hakkas, the indigenous people, and others with origins outside of Taiwan. The proportion of Hakkas who have shifted their support to the Pan-Green camp is the highest in relative terms. Third, the secessionist forces have their stronghold in the southern part of Taiwan, and have expanded gradually from thence into the middle and northern parts of the island. Even in Taipei, the base of the Pan-Blue camp, the DPP pulled 6% more votes in the 2004 election than in 2000. Fourth, the numbers of intellectuals and those with diplomas and degrees or above have increased, thus correspondingly enhancing the DPP’s power to hoodwink the island’s people.

　　Not all the supporters of the Pan-Green camp are members of the independence fundamentalists.

　　The base of the Pan-Green camp has increased from 30% before the DPP came to power, to more than 40% today. Chen Shui-bian won over 50% of the vote in the 2004 election. However, not all DPP supporters and Taiwan Solidarity Union(TSU) supporters are fundamentalist independence followers. The composition of voters for the Pan-Green camp is complex. It can be analyzed in terms of the following several classes.

　　The first category supporting Taiwan independence and opposing reunification are die-hard supporters of the DPP and elements of the TSU who seek urgent independence – the so-called deep-green voters. The proportion of their support increased from 10% to 15% before the DPP came into power, to about 25% today. These comprise the main body of the Taiwan independence foundation. The second category, traditional Pan-Green supporters, also known as light green voters, identify with the DPP’s principle of “democracy, human rights, reform and an end to corruption.” They oppose the dictatorship of the KMT and its black-gold politics and account for more than 15% of Pan-Green support.

　　The third category, voters with a special feeling for the “Son of Taiwan” – Chen Shui-bian – and the Pan-Green camp, deceived as they are by the claims of the Pan-Green camp to be a local political force; these constitute approximately 5%.

　　The fourth category consists of that portion of voters who have made out well under the Chen Shui-bian administration’s achievements. They account for approximately 5%.

　　It is not difficult to see that, at present, voters from the fundamentalist wing of the Taiwan independence camp account for about 25%. It is possible that voters from other classes will change their viewpoints under varying circumstances.

　　Viewed from the standpoint of total endorsement, that of the DPP and the TSU has never been higher than 28%. Since 2005, DPP endorsement has been declining to a marked extent, and has fallen far behind that of the KMT. This proves that the voter foundation of the Pan-Green camp is mutable, and the number of ardent supporters of the party in favor of Taiwan independence has limits.

　　As a result of the “free day” mentality and agitation by secessionists, who claim to be a local political force, more Hokkienese people have turned to the DPP. At the same time, more Hakkas also endorse the DPP. This is mainly due to the administrative resources of the Chen Shui-bian administration. It is not a foregone conclusion that the Hokkienese people and Hakkas who support the DPP are also dedicated followers of the Taiwan independence secessionist forces.

　　Viewed from the standpoint of the class foundations for Taiwan independence, secessionist forces have been expanding as a result of the combined impetus of political status, special interests and historical factors. Again, this does not prove that these classes are dedicated followers of the DPP and the secessionist forces. Even the middle class, from which they draw most of their support, has many followers of the Pan-Blue camp. Although most of the upper bourgeoisie, the so-called “green financial groups,” are loyal supporters of the Pan-Green camp, a minority supports the latter only in response to political pressures. Although the DPP and secessionist forces have curried favor with the working class and farmers by dispensing petty incentives and benefits, they can never represent the true interests of these lower classes.

　　The secessionist administration, with the connivance of the US, is another pivotal factor explaining the increased foundations of support for independence.

　　The increased foundations result from the historical evolution of Taiwan society, the secessionist administration and collusive American and Japanese support. The Taiwan public’s call for the “free day” is an internal factor in the expansion of support for the secessionists. Isolated from and confronted by the Chinese mainland, the Taiwan people have become estranged from it. The KMT’s despotic dictatorship and black-gold politics are disagreeable memories for the Taiwan people. Over the last 20 years, the splittist administrations of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian and the clamoring of the secessionists are the direct cause of the expansion of support for independence.

　　America’s connivance in and support of independence is the primary factor explaining why the Taiwan question remains unresolved and why the movement has spread. The US is not only the early base camp for separatist activities, but also the key prop for secessionist movements in Taiwan. The US enlists aid in the form of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, as well as the DPP and the secessionist forces. The US has pursued the policy of marginalizing China by supporting Taiwan. It supports the Pan-Green camp and undermines the Pan-Blue camp, as well as supporting and colluding with the independence gradualists. It is for these reasons that secessionist forces and the foundations of independence have expanded. It is also for these reasons that the DPP seized power in 2000 and Chen Shui-bian won reelection in 2004, and also explains how Chen was even able to extricate himself from the predicament posed by the anti-Chen campaign launched in 2006, just as he had survived an earlier threat to his power.

　　The pernicious expansion of the foundations of independence complicates the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

　　It determines the varying fortunes of the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps, the evolution of political structures in Taiwan and Taiwanese views on reunification or independence. It impedes communication between the mainland and the Taiwan, and complicates the prospects for peaceful reunification.

　　The pernicious expansion of the foundations of independence encourages secessionist forces to challenge reunification, campaign for independence and oppose the one-China principle. Although Chen Shui-bian calls for Constitutional reform and a referendum, in fact demands for independence were frustrated as a result of a crackdown by the mainland and US exertion of management and control; it is possible that the secessionists will continue to promote de jure independence if they return to power. Such an event would impair the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and pose a serious challenge in a period of strategic opportunities.

　　At the same time, the Pan-Blue camp’s base has weakened. The expansion of the foundations of independence has marginalized those who oppose Taiwan independence. After the DPP came to power, support for independence hovered around 40%, while the Pan-Blue camp had about 45% support. Although there are more Pan-Blue supporters than Pan-Green camp supporters in Taiwan, the Pan-Blue position has taken a beating.

　　The political structure of Taiwan is becoming obvious. The two parties’ taking turns to govern represents the status quo. With the development of the foundations of independence, the Pan-Green camp has lost further strength. Competition for political power has become fiercer. This is a reflection of public opinion: Taiwan does not want to see major change. Therefore, the secessionists and their opponents are engaged in fierce, no-holds-barred combat for expansion of their bases. It thus appears that revolving-door administrations by the KMT and the DPP will become the future norm.

　　Urgent independence forces are exerting a greater influence on the DPP, including a sharp increase on their impact on its power-structure policy and manner of governance. The strong support of Taiwan independence fundamentalists had a close nexus with Chen Shui-bian’s ability to muddle his way through the anti-corruption and anti-Chen campaign of 2006. On the other hand, when Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-deh opted to withdraw from the DPP, this was not only the result of a power struggle within the party, but also of the result of ostracism by independence fundamentalists. Tsai Ing-wen, who became DPP chairperson in May 2008 with the support of Chen Shui-bian and the independence fundamentalists, has experienced difficulties in cementing her position and found it hard to effectuate her practical proposals for cross-Straits policy adjustments.

　　There is little probability of an imminent collapse or fragmentation of the foundations for independence.

　　The miserable failures of the DPP in the prefectural governor and general elections, for the legislature and for the presidency have delivered a setback to the pernicious spread of the foundations of independence; however, support for the Pan-Green camp remains at around 40%. Since Taiwan absentee Ma Ying-jeou has to defer to his own reelection hopes, he and his party have had to address the issue of Taiwan advanced by the DPP. This explains why they dare not go ahead with the desinicization advocated by the Chen Shui-bian group. This is why the issue of Taiwan, which has so increased under the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, still indicates an upward trend. Public opinion on desinicization and Taiwan independence has not been checked. It may not be possible to fundamentally resolve the contradictions between provincial identities, ethnic groups and between reunification and independence tendencies. Especially given US strategic considerations in support of Taiwan independence, localization may indeed deepen. Although the foundations of independence will be constricted for a long period, there is little probability of their collapsing.

　　It merits note that, in certain environments and under certain circumstances, the possibility of further growth of the foundations of independence may not be discounted. If the DPP returns to power in future, its adherents may increase their support by using their power to develop cross-Straits relations at the same time as they manipulate the “localization” issue. Competent governance may also win over some members of different social classes to further increase support for independence.

　　If China catches up with or even overtakes the US in terms of economic strength, this will constitute an important factor in what must be the eventual decline of support for Taiwan independence.  

　　If China’s GDP can overtake that of the US, and China can comprehensively improve its overall strength, the country will become more influential in world political and economic affairs and cross-Straits relations will undergo strategic adjustments. At such time, the US will lose its predominance in economic and military affairs to China and thus, in the face of China’s intransigence, the risk of war from and the costs associated with American support for Taiwan independence will increase. This means that the US will be forced to adjust its policy toward China and, consequently, diminish its support for independence, with the result that independence activities will decline. On another level, a more powerful Chinese mainland will exercise greater power to thwart the spread of the independence movement, while exerting a greater attraction to Taiwan people. All this must lead to ever-improved commercial and trade relations and communications at all levels between cross-Straits compatriots and lead to enhancement of common interests and positive sentiments. Enhanced cooperation in matters of politics, economics and security will become the practical choice for most Taiwan people. The influence of independence, “localization” and “ethnic politics” will distinctly weaken. More will identify with the mainland and support for independence will thus ebb. The foundations of independence will  gradually weaken. It is obvious that the anti-China forces of the US, Japan and other countries will not reconcile themselves to abandonment of their strategic interests in the Taiwan Straits region without a shot. They may continue to surreptitiously support independence, and independence forces will struggle at all costs to retain their former influence. This means that even China’s growth in economic strength might not lead to any rapid disappearance of independence politics. It will only be with reunification, deepened political, economic, cultural and social relations and electoral defeat of secessionism, that the foundations of independence will enter a phase of retreat.

　　Taiwan independence is in decline, as is the basis of its support; this represents an inevitable historical development. However, it will take a long-term historical process to check independence and achieve reunification. The defeat of the foundations of independence will further be a complicated process. But the development of the mainland, breakthroughs in winning over public opinion in matters of politics, economics, post-reunification security and gradual emotional integration will dictate that the foundations of independence must inevitably shrivel and die.