Amajor Innovation in the Policy and Theory Relating to Taiwan

Liu Hong

　　In the six guidelines General Secretary Hu Jintao put forward concerning the relations across the Taiwan Straits at a forum marking the 30th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Our Compatriots in Taiwan, he created a strategic framework for the peaceful development of the cross-Straits relations encompassing politics, economics, culture, society, foreign affairs and negotiations. In addition, to meet actual needs and keep up with the times, he accomplished political, theoretical and policy breakthroughs relating to our Taiwan work. This has enriched the Party’s theory of peaceful reunification and constitutes a major theoretical innovation in the principles and policies concerning Taiwan.

A Glorious Document on the New Strategy for Our Taiwan Work

　　Over the past five years, in terms of strategic design and policy guidance, Hu Jintao made statements on Taiwan on the basis of “one country, two systems” and the “eight-point proposal” on nine important occasions to reveal the basic laws governing across-Straits relations and guiding our Taiwan work. In addition to the comprehensive statement he made in his report to the Party’s Seventeenth National Congress, he expounded four guidelines each time when he met with representatives from Taiwan, the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, and the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots attending sessions of the National People’s Congress or the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on March 11, 2003, March 4, 2005 and March 4, 2008 respectively. He also expounded four guidelines in his speeches when he met with Lien Chan, Chairman of the KMT, on April 29, 2005, James Song, Chairman of the People First Party, on May 12, 2005, Yok Mu-ming, Chairman of the New Party, on July 12, 2005, Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of the KMT, on April 16, 2006, and Wu Poh-hsiung, Chairman of the KMT, on May 28, 2008.

　　The most representative four guidelines were expounded on March 4, 2005, when Hu Jintao visited members of the CPPCC National Committee representing the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, and the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots who were attending a session of the CPPCC National Committee. The four guidelines are, “We will unswervingly uphold the one-China principle, never give up our efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, never change the principle of placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan, and uncompromisingly oppose secessionist activities aimed at Taiwan independence.” These guidelines have become the core aspect of our Taiwan policy. On April 16, 2006, when he met with Lien Chan, Honorary Chairman of the KMT, and participants at an across-Straits business forum, Hu Jintao issued four more guidelines in which he stressed for the first time the need to firmly grasp the peaceful development of across-Straits relations as the theme. This speech has become a guide to the peaceful development of across-Straits relations. When he met with Wu Poh-hsiung, Chairman of the KMT, on May 28, 2008, Hu Jintao put forward the policy of “building mutual trust, shelving disputes, seeking common ground while recognizing differences, and working together for a win-win situation.” This policy has become the guiding principle for the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and the Straits Exchange Foundation to resume talks and the basic norms for their negotiations. It is under the guidance of these four guidelines that the mainland of the motherland has formulated a new Taiwan work strategy for developing the mainland, curbing Taiwan independence, benefiting our Taiwan compatriots, and carrying out party-to-party exchanges and ushered in a new phase for the period of strategic opportunities for across-Straits relations and their peaceful development.

　　In an important period when across-Straits exchanges needed to expand into more areas and move to higher levels and when the peaceful development of across-Straits relations needed to unfold in all respects, Hu Jintao put forward six guidelines on letting us join hands to promote the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations and striving with a united will for the great renaissance of the Chinese nation at a forum marking the 30th anniversary of the issuance of the historic document “Message to Our Compatriots in Taiwan.” This speech is a summary of the Taiwan guidelines the mainland formulated over the past five years, contains the main points Hu Jintao made in the talks he gave on the nine occasions, and constitutes a comprehensive and well-designed system. The six guidelines review the laws governing the development of the across-Straits relations, serve as a more clear-cut principle guiding the peaceful development of these relations, are better strategically designed, constitute a more systematic policy structure, have a richer theoretical content, a more solid practical foundation, and a clearer direction, and all the more stress the need to be pragmatic in promoting exchanges and seize the initiative in our work.

A Major Innovation in Statements on Policies on Taiwan

　　As a programmatic document guiding the development of the across-Straits relations for a rather long time to come, the six guidelines offer a farsighted view of the situation. In addition to upholding the principle, the document contains more new meaning and thinking and demonstrates the motherland is inclusive, pragmatic and open. It is evident that the document is easy to implement and fully embodies major innovations in the mainland’s statements on Taiwan.

　　First, the document defines the nature of the Taiwan question as “political antagonism.”

　　A correct definition of the nature of the Taiwan question builds a foundation for across-Straits dialogue and exchanges and promotes the course of the peaceful development of the across-Straits relations, and has a great bearing on the direction of the development of these relations. There are various opinions about the nature of the Taiwan question that are not in line with the current state of the across-Straits relations. These opinions hold that the Taiwan question represents a struggle between two systems, between rich and poor, and between people’s will, involves a special state-to-state relationship, and shows that there is a country on each side of the Taiwan Straits. These opinions affect and damage the normal development of the across-Straits relations. The mainland also had different statements on the one-China principle in different periods and against different backgrounds, and these statements played an important role back then. As we are now in the period of peaceful development of the across-Straits relations, the six guidelines hold that the nature of the Taiwan question “merely represents a state of political antagonism that is a lingering legacy of the Chinese civil war waged in the mid- to late-1940s. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. For the two sides of the Straits to return to unity will not effect an alteration of sovereignty or territory, but merely end political antagonism.” So the nature of the Taiwan question represents “a state of political antagonism that is a lingering legacy of the Chinese civil war.” The state of across-Straits relations is that although the mainland and Taiwan have not been reunified, “this does not alter the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China.” The future is as follows: “For the two sides of the Straits to return to unity will not effect an alteration of sovereignty or territory, but merely end political antagonism.” This definition of the Taiwan question makes it possible to consider the political status of Taiwan all the more from the perspective that the Taiwan question “represents a state of political antagonism that is a lingering legacy of the Chinese civil war.”

　　Second, the document promotes the “normalization of across-Straits economic relations” and “institutionalization of across-Straits relations of economic cooperation.”

　　Now that the three direct links are more or less in place, how should the two sides of the Straits deepen their economic cooperation and work together against the impact of global financial crisis? They must strengthen their financial cooperation, normalize their economic relations and institutionalize their economic cooperation. Taiwan holds that in order to prevent its economy from being marginalized, the two sides should sign CECA as the basic framework for the economic cooperation and trade between them. The mainland is only too willing to sign similar agreements on the basis of its experience with the CEPA it has with Hong Kong and Macao. In point of fact, differences between the two sides as to how to call the agreement are not important; what counts is its content. If the two sides normalize their economic relations and institutionalize their economic cooperation, this will have far-reaching significance for their economic relations and trade: their economic cooperation will be direct, bilateral, and comprehensive, there will be a free flow of personnel, goods and capital, their economic cooperation will be gradually institutionalized and standardized, their investment will become bilateral, their economic cooperation will be deepened, and their common interests will further increase, thus making the foundation of the peaceful development of their relations more solid.

　　Third, the document promotes Chinese culture and strengthens spiritual bonds.

　　Chinese culture boasts a long history illuminated by glorious splendors. It is a common and precious asset of our compatriots on both sides and an important link guaranteeing the national emotional bonds between them. Both sides share the same culture. Chinese culture has deep roots and luxuriant foliage in Taiwan; Taiwan culture has enriched the substance of Chinese culture. The sentiments of our Taiwan compatriots who love their home and their land are exactly an embodiment of the traditional culture of the Chinese nation. Loving Taiwan is, in essence, the same as opposing secession that is aimed at Taiwan independence. Seeking Taiwan independence using the pretext of loving Taiwan will only damage the peaceful development on both sides and bring about a disaster for the Chinese nation. Our compatriots on both sides should jointly inherit and promote the exquisite traditions of Chinese culture, conduct cultural exchanges in varied forms and enable Chinese culture to pass down from one generation to the next enhanced, so as to boost our national consciousness, build up a common will and generate spiritual strength for the joint endeavor toward the great renaissance of the Chinese nation. It is of particular necessity to expand youth exchanges between the two sides, so as to continuously infuse exuberant vitality into the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations. Therefore, it is in the interests of our compatriots on both sides and the Chinese nation to continue to adopt active measures, including our readiness to negotiate an agreement on cross-Straits cultural and educational exchanges, and to boost such exchanges and cooperation to a new level, one where they are more extensive in scope and higher in caliber.

　　Fourth, the document says, “To the extent that the DPP recants its Taiwan independence secessionist position, this will elicit a positive response from us.”

　　In his six guidelines, Hu Jintao reiterates, “As to those individuals who formerly advocated, engaged in, or pursued Taiwan independence, we shall also warmly and sincerely welcome them to return to the correct course of promoting the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.” With regard to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on the one hand he “hopes that it will realize a clear understanding of the tenor of the times, and cease carrying out its Taiwan independence secessionist activities and acting at loggerheads with the common wish of the entire nation.” On the other hand, he says, “To the extent that the DPP recants its Taiwan independence secessionist position, this will elicit a positive response from us.” This was the first time the mainland singled the DPP by name in order to warn it to keep up with the entire Chinese nation’s endeavor to promote the peaceful development of across-Straits relations, and demonstrated the mainland’s attitude that it places hopes on the DPP and will let bygones be bygones. No matter what members of the DPP and its followers and supporters did or said in favor of Taiwan independence, as long as they now support the peaceful development of across-Straits relations, the mainland will appreciate it. This was the first time Hu Jintao publicly expounded the mainland’s DPP policy on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on an important occasion. This shows that the mainland attaches great importance to the existence of the DPP, places hopes on it, and is willing to provide a platform for it to play a political role in developing across-Straits relations after renouncing its Taiwan independence stance. That also shows that the mainland’s Taiwan policy is inclusive and open.

　　Fifth, the document says that “fair and reasonable arrangements” can be effected for the issue of Taiwan’s participation in the activities of international organizations.

　　As far as Taiwan’s foreign affairs are concerned, its priority is to join international organizations. After Ma Ying-jeou assumed office, he continues to pay great attention to Taiwan’s “international space,” though he focuses on acquiring practical interests for Taiwan. He is now silencing the call for greater international space for Taiwan in order to avoid confrontation with the mainland. He stated that Taiwan will make flexible, pragmatic and low-profile efforts to participate in the activities of international organizations. Our Taiwan compatriots hope they will participate in the activities of functional international organizations permitted under international law and relevant organic laws. Proceeding from this fact, the six guidelines say that the mainland understands our Taiwan compatriots’ feelings on the issue of participation in international activities and wants to reduce the unnecessary across-Straits strife in foreign affairs, so it agrees that fair and reasonable arrangements can be effected through pragmatic consultation between the two sides to resolve the issue of participation in activities of international organizations, provided that this does not give rise to notions of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” All this fully demonstrates the mainland is sincere and friendly toward Taiwan and is ready to make considerable flexible space available for it. Of course, foreign affairs involve many issues, so Taiwan should be patient and work to resolve them systematically in stages.

　　Sixth, the document expands the topics of across-Straits dialogue.

　　What should be done after the three direct links are established across the Straits? How can political breakthroughs be achieved in the period of peaceful development of across-Straits relations? It has become inevitable to start across-Straits political dialogue at an opportune time and this will be conducive to the peaceful development of across-Straits relations. The six guidelines point to the direction of political dialogue.

　　1) The two sides “may make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been reunified.” It is indeed difficult to resolve the following issues within a short period of time: the lingering political antagonism as a result of the Chinese civil war, the political status of the two sides of the Straits, and the estrangement caused by 60 years of political antagonism. Therefore, pragmatic explorations are needed for their resolution.

　　2) Exploring a mechanism for fostering mutual trust with respect to military security, having the two sides engage and exchange with each other on military issues, and making arrangements for the issues of concern for our Taiwan compatriots, and eventually establishing a mechanism for fostering mutual trust with respect to military security will allay Taiwan’s apprehensions relating to military security and help stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Straits.

　　3) The Taiwan question represents lingering political antagonism as a result of the Chinese civil war, so it is necessary to carry out consultation to officially end the state of cross-Straits hostilities by signing a peace agreement and build a political, military, foreign-related, economic and financial framework for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

　　We must have new ideas for the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, adopt new approaches to initiating a new phase, accomplish new breakthroughs in winning popular support, and carry out exchanges with Taiwan at a new level. The peaceful development of cross-Straits relations is a novelty and a new creation and requires new theory and policy. In his speech at a forum marking the 30th anniversary of the issuance of the Message to Our Compatriots in Taiwan, General Secretary Hu Jinta makes all his theoretical innovations concerning Taiwan with a focus on the most important and difficult aspects of the across-Straits relations and the issues demanding urgent solutions. His six guidelines have enriched the theory of national reunification and the mainland’s Taiwan policies and principles and will promote the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.