THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S POLICY CONCERNING TAIWAN(Part One)

　　The policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concerning Taiwan up to this point can be divided into four periods. The international and domestic situations and the nature of cross-Straits relations were different in each of the four periods, so our tasks and the emphasis of our work differed somewhat in each. However, the development of our policy in each of the periods progressed with the times and there is a common thread running through them.

　　The first period: The policy of liberating Taiwan

　　The CPC and the Chinese government’s policy of liberating Taiwan went through two stages: liberating Taiwan by force and liberating Taiwan peacefully.

　　1. Liberating Taiwan by force

　　After our victories in the Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Beiping-Tianjin campaigns, the defeat of the Kuomintang was sealed. At that time the CPC Central Committee surmised that the Kuomintang would take its last stand on Taiwan. In order to complete the New Democratic Revolution and liberate the whole of China, the CPC drew up a strategic plan for liberating Taiwan. On March 15, 1949, the Xinhua News Agency published the editorial “The Chinese People Will Definitely Liberate Taiwan.” This was the first mention of liberating Taiwan. In June 1949, the Central Military Commission sent several telegrams to the Third Field Army and the East China Office of the Central Committee directing them to earnestly study the problem of liberating Taiwan, giving priority to liberating it quickly at low cost.

　　After the founding of New China, the Party and government promptly carried military deployment and set up front-line headquarters under the command of General Su Yu. On December 31, 1949, the CPC Central Committee published the Notice to All Officers and Soldiers on the Front and Compatriots throughout the Country, which clearly stated that the tasks for 1950 were to “liberate Hainan Island, Taiwan and Tibet and completely annihilate the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique.”

　　The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. On June 27, US President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet of the US Navy to enter the Taiwan Straits and the 13th Airborne Division of the US Air Force to garrison in Taiwan, thereby openly blocking the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan. This act of aggression was met with strong protest and opposition by the Chinese government and people. After the CPC made the strategic decision to resist US aggression and aid North Korea and to protect our homeland and safeguard our country, our strategic focus shifted from the south to the northeast, and we were forced to shelve the plan to liberate Taiwan.

　　The Korean War ended in July 1953. The Taiwan authorities began ratcheting up the pressure on the United States to sign a mutual defense treaty. In July 1954, the Party and government again set forth the task of liberating Taiwan to the Chinese people and said they could not accept the interference of the US military and its occupation of Taiwan. On September 3, the PLA began shelling Quemoy (the so-called first Taiwan crisis). The American government ignored the Chinese people’s strong opposition and signed a mutual defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek’s clique on December 2, bringing Taiwan and the Penghu Islands under the American defense umbrella and obstructing China’s reunification. Zhou Enlai issued a statement on this matter on December 8, in which he stated that the so-called mutual defense treaty is illegal and invalid, and that the Chinese people would liberate Taiwan and complete the total reunification of the motherland. On January 2, 1955, the PLA launched an attack on Kuomintang forces on the Yijiangshan Islands and Dachen Archipelago and liberated both of them.

　　2. Liberating Taiwan peacefully

　　After the Yijiangshan Islands and Dachen Archipelago were liberated, the only territory the Chiang Kai-shek clique controlled was Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Quemoy and Matsu. The United States’ meddling in Taiwan’s affairs increased, and conflicts between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek arose. The United States tried to promote a two-China policy, and ultimately break Taiwan off from China. Chiang Kai-shek adhered to a one-China policy because Taiwan shared a common language with the motherland on the mainland. At the same time, international tensions were decreasing. An armistice ending the Korean War was signed in July 1953, and an armistice ending the French-Indochina War was signed in July 1954. In these circumstances, the international community turned its attention to the tense Taiwan situation.The Chinese motherland on the mainland was carrying out socialist reform and had just begun the First Five-Year Plan for economic development, and needed a peaceful and stable international environment. Therefore, the CPC promptly adjusted its policy toward the United States and Taiwan and stated its intention to liberate Taiwan peacefully. It undertook work in two areas.

　　First, the Chinese government pressed for talks between the American and Chinese governments. During the Asian-African Conference (Bandung Conference) in April 1955, Zhou Enlai issued a statement declaring, “The Chinese people are friends with the American people. China does not want to fight the United States. The Chinese government is willing to sit down with the American government and hold talks on how to relax tensions in the Far East, particularly on how to relax tensions in the Taiwan region.” This statement received a positive response from the American side and led to discussions between Chinese and American ambassadors in Vienna and Warsaw. In all there were 136 meetings between August 1955 and 1970, and for the most part they focused on Taiwan.

　　Second, the Chinese government proposed the peaceful liberation of Taiwan to the Taiwan authorities. At a meeting with Premier U Nu during a visit to Myanmar in April 1955, Zhou Enlai said, “If the United States withdraws it is possible we could liberate Taiwan by peaceful means. If Chiang Kai-shek agrees we would welcome a delegation he sends to Beijing for negotiations.” “If Chiang Kai-shek agrees to peace and unity in China and to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and sends a delegation to Beijing to negotiate, we believe the Chinese people can forgive him.” At the 15th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in May, Zhou Enlai clearly stated, “There are two ways the Chinese people can liberate Taiwan, by war and by peaceful means. If the conditions make it possible, the Chinese people are willing to do everything possible to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means.” This was the first time the proposal to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means was stated publicly.

　　Beginning in 1956, the Chinese motherland on the mainland entered a period of comprehensive socialist construction, and it not only needed a peaceful and stable environment, but also needed to mobilize all positive factors. In this kind of situation, the CPC further developed its thinking on striving to liberate Taiwan peacefully and further proposed the third cooperation with the Kuomintang. In a speech at the Supreme State Conference in 1956, Mao Zedong said, “The ancients had a saying, ‘Let bygones be bygones.’ We should unify everyone both at home and abroad who can be unified, requiring only that they now love the country, and struggle together for our common objectives.” He also said that if there is a group of people in Taiwan who take the patriotic standpoint, we welcome them to work for our common objectives individually, in groups or collectively.” He also declared, “The Kuomintang and Communist Party have already cooperated twice, and we are prepared to cooperate with them a third time.” On a number of occasions after this, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai further expounded a specific formula for the peaceful liberation of Taiwan. The key points of this formula are:

　　1) People could visit relatives and make friends, and go back and forth freely. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai fully understood the feelings and wishes of the members of the Kuomintang military and government to be reunited with their families. They would be able to communicate with their relatives on the mainland and come back to visit their families and make friends. People’s governments at all levels guaranteed their freedom of movement and would provide all necessary assistance.

　　2) Let bygones be bygones and reward those who make a positive contribution. Everyone who was willing to take the path of peaceful reunification, without distinguishing early or late, and no matter who they are or what crimes they might have committed in the past, the Chinese people will welcome them with open arms and let bygones be bygones. The Chinese people will reward anyone who contributes to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan appropriately and give them a suitable position in accordance with the nature of their contribution. If Taiwan breaks off relations with the United States, it could send representatives to participate in the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, but foreign military forces must withdraw from the Taiwan straits.

　　3) The Kuomintang and Communist Party would cooperate in the spirit of all patriots belonging to one family. The two parties cooperated twice before. The first time was when the National Revolutionary Army successfully carried out the Northern Expedition against the northern warlords, and the second time was when they cooperated to defeat the Japanese. These are the facts. Peace is paramount, and all patriots belong to one family. Patriotism doesn’t distinguish between early and late. The Taiwan question is an internal affair, and the Communist Party is prepared to cooperate with the Kuomintang for the third time.

　　4) Taiwan would be liberated peacefully and neither side would undermine the other. The possibility for peaceful liberation of Taiwan is increasing. Not only do our Taiwan compatriots, that is, the Kuomintang military and government personnel who fled to Taiwan, want to return to the embrace of the motherland, but also more and more people are coming to understand that reunification is the path there is to take. If Taiwan returns to the motherland everything can be the way it was before, but Taiwan cannot send spies to engage in espionage, and we will not send “Red spies” there either.

　　Whenever the CPC Central Committee has dealt with the Taiwan question, it has always separated its conflicts with the Taiwan authorities from its conflicts with the United States, and firmly opposed interference and meddling by any foreign forces. Ever since the first Taiwan crisis, the US government constantly pressured the Chiang Kai-shek clique to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu in order to having the CPC and the KMT rule different sides of the Taiwan Straits. This scheme was met with opposition from both sides of the straits. In order to safeguard the basic interests of the state and nation, at appropriate times the CPC adopted tactics based on the view that even Chiang Kai-shek opposed the United States. On August 23, 1958, the PLA hit Quemoy with a fierce artillery barrage. This was the second Taiwan crisis, which sent tremors around the world. This struck a powerful blow to the American scheme of having the CPC and the KMT rule different sides of the Taiwan Straits.

　　After bombarding Quemoy, the CPC set forth a number of important principles for solving the Taiwan question. On May 22, 1962, Mao Zedong chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the Taiwan question. Standing Committee members agreed that it would be better if Taiwan remained in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and his son than if it were to fall into the hands of the United States. We could wait out Chiang Kai-shek. If we can’t reunify while he remains in power, maybe we will be able to when the next generation comes to power. At present we can’t even get Chiang Kai-shek to give up Taiwan to us. We need to gradually create the proper conditions, and when the time is ripe, the matter will be easy to deal with.

　　In 1963, Zhou Enlai summarized the CPC’s policy on Taiwan as “one guiding principle and four points.” The one guiding principle is that Taiwan must reunite with China. The four points are: First, after Taiwan reunites with the motherland, except for foreign affairs, which must be unified in the hands of the central authorities, Taiwan’s political and military authority, personnel arrangements and other matters will all be in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek. Second, all military and government expenditures and costs of economic development that Taiwan could not pay for itself, would be paid for by the central government (at that time, Taiwan was running a deficit of $800 million a year). Third, the reform of Taiwan society could proceed slowly, and would be carried out when conditions were ripe, with due consideration to Chiang Kai-shek’s views and on the basis of decisions made through consultation. Fourth, neither side would send spies or try to undermine the other’s unity. Mao Zedong repeatedly stated that for as long as the Taiwan authorities kept Taiwan from falling into foreign hands and did not try to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese motherland on the mainland would not change its present relations with Taiwan.

　　With the CPC pressing its Taiwan policy, progress was made in our work through strenuous effort in all areas. However, the Cultural Revolution seriously interfered with and did harm to our Taiwan work. At this time, Zhou Enlai protected a large number of democratic personages and friends who later played an important role in our Taiwan work.

　　Beginning in the 1970s, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai set in motion the normalization of relations with the United States, the restoration of China’s rightful seat in the United Nations and the normalization of relations with Japan, all of which are indispensable conditions for ultimately resolving the Taiwan question. (To be continued)