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Following its establishment, between March 1992 and April 1993, on the authority of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office and on the basis of adhering to the one-China principle during exchanges and routine discussions, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) carried out talks with the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the topics of “the adoption of cross-Strait notarized documents” and “setting up a cross-Strait registered mail inquiry and compensation service.” The China Notaries Association and the Professional Committee of the China Institute of Communications participated in each of the respective discussions. During the initial talks between the two sides, the one-China principle became a prominent issue. The ARATS suggested that the one-China principle should be the basis on which the two sides carry out exchanges and discussions, and that specific issues arising in the course of cross-Strait exchanges were China’s internal affairs and should therefore be properly solved through consultation on the basis of the one-China principle. However, in accordance with a requirement of the Mainland Affairs Council, the SEF stated that it did not have the authority to discuss the one-China principle. During the talks the SEF also expressed several opinions that clearly violated the one-China principle. For example, when addressing the issue of adopting cross-Strait notarized documents, the SEF proposed that the two countries’ embassies and consulates should handle the adoption of the mainland’s notarized documents in Taiwan. While discussing the issue of setting up a cross-Strait registered postal service, the SEF also talked about “postal links between the two countries.” The Taiwan authorities’ avoidance of discussing or mentioning the one-China principle was an attempt to use the talks to achieve political aims and a way of creating two political entities on equal footing, and it complicated two originally simple and routine issues. Facts show that to carry out cross-Strait talks, there must first be consensus on the one-China principle. Without a consensus on this, there can be no routine cross-Strait discussions. As a result, at the end of the first working-level talks between the ARATS and the SEF in March 1992, to counter the Taiwan authorities’ misinterpretation and taking into account the doubts of some of the Taiwan people, the ARATS’s executive vice-chairman Tang Shubei elaborated on the issue of adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks. Tang Shubei pointed out, first of all, that the talks should reflect reality, and that the existence of one China was an objective fact. He said that only by adhering to the one-China principle and taking into account the reality that each side has its own system, will they be able to seek truth from facts, amicably and reasonably deal with various specific issues in cross-Strait exchanges, and truly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Second, he pointed out that neither side had originally disputed the one-China principle, which could be seen from conversations between the leaders of both sides and relevant documents released by the Taiwan authorities. Therefore, both sides obviously believed in one China, and only a few officials in charge of mainland affairs from the Taiwan authorities objected to expressing that there is only one China and disagreed that both sides should deal with issues in cross-Strait exchanges on the basis of the one-China principle. Third, Tang Shubei pointed out that adhering to the one-China principle during the routine discussions had been proposed simply so that both sides could make clear their attitude of adhering to the one-China principle, and not so that the ARATS could discuss with the SEF the connotations of the one-China principle. He even went so far as to suggest that both sides could negotiate how to adhere to the one-China principle. Afterwards, Tang Shubie summarized that during cross-Strait routine talks the following points related to the one-China principle should be adhered to: specific issues in cross-Strait exchanges are the internal affairs of China and they should be discussed and resolved on the basis of the one-China principle; during routine discussions, both sides need only acknowledge that they adhere to the one-China principle and need not discuss the political connotations of the one-China principle, and the manner in which this should be acknowledged could be fully discussed and the ARATS was willing to listen to the views of the SEF and Taiwanese people from all sectors of society. The ARATS’s reasonable stance provoked a reaction from compatriots in Taiwan, which meant the Taiwan authorities could not avoid the issue. Subsequently, a debate raged within the Taiwan authorities as to whether they should make clear their position on the one-China principle during routine talks. Following three months of discussion, on August 1, 1992, Taiwan’s National Unification Council issued its conclusion on the meaning of one China: “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle, but the two sides differ over the meaning ascribed to it.…Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, with two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait….Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.” This conclusion clearly states that the Taiwan authorities, on the one hand, advocate “two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait” and seeks the status of an “equal political entity.” On the other hand, it expresses adherence to the one-China principle and recognizes the fact that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. Seeing as the Taiwan authorities stated that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China policy,” on August 27, the head of the ARATS issued a statement confirming that both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhering to the one-China policy was of great significance for cross-Strait routine talks as “it shows that adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks has already become the consensus on both sides of the Strait.” In September of the same year, the secretary-generals of the ARATS and the SEF met in Macao to formally exchange views on issues relating to expressing adherence to the one-China principle. The representative from the ARATS said to the representative from the SEF that, “The Taiwan sides’ conclusion on the one-China principle explained that both sides are in consensus that they should adhere to the one-China principle during routine talks. But we do not agree with the relevant Taiwan authorities’ explanation of the connotations of there being one China, nor are we able to discuss with the SEF the connotations of there being one China.” The ARATS’s representative also recommended that the SEF seriously consider directly stating that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.” From October 27 to 29, 1992, the ARATS and the SEF carried out working-level talks in Hong Kong. During the talks, the ARATS’s representative proposed five points related to expressing adherence to the one-China principle. The SEF’s representative proposed eight such points (five written and three verbal) to be discussed with the ARATS’s representative. The eighth (verbal) point was, “In the process of both sides of the Taiwan Strait seeking national reunification, though both sides adhere to the one-China principle, they have different understandings of the meaning of one China.” The SEF’s representative called this the Taiwan sides’ sine qua non, and suggested that each side should “state orally their stance.” On November 1, after the talks in Hong Kong had concluded, the SEF’s representative issued a written statement on acceptance of the one-China principle during routine talks, which recommended that both sides should, within mutually acceptable limits, state verbally their stance on the matter. The ARATS studied the SEF’s eighth point and felt that it showed that the Taiwan side was seeking reunification and adherence to the one-China principle. Although the SEF had suggested both sides “have a different understanding of the meaning of one China,” it had not specifically set forth the Taiwan side’s views, and the ARATS had always advocated only adhering to the one-China principle and not discussing the meaning of “one China.” In view of the SEF’s attitude of adhering to the one-China principle and seeking national reunification, the ARATS was also willing to consider, together with the SEF, verbally expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and it expressed its hope that the SEF could confirm that this was the formal view of the Taiwan side. On January 3, the SEF issued a press release and wrote a letter to the ARATS stating that it had received permission from relevant parties in Taiwan for each side to make a verbal statement. On the basis of the above work, that same day, the ARATS deputy secretary-general phoned the secretary-general of the SEF, Chen Rong-jye, regarding this matter and stated that the recent working-level talks between the ARATS and SEF had “achieved progress on the issue of mentioning the one-China principle during routine talks,” and that, following their research, the ARATS respected and accepted the SEF’s suggestion that both parties should make verbal statements expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and that the specific content of the verbal statements would require separate consultations. On November 16, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF pointing out that at the talks in Hong Kong the SEF had “proposed specific content, which explicitly stated that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle,” and reiterated their agreement to stating verbally that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle” and proposed the main points for the verbal statements: “Both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle and are striving for national reunification. But the meaning of “one China” shall not be covered in cross-Strait routine talks.” The ARATS also attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal as content on which the two sides had reached consensus. On December 3, the SEF wrote back stating that they had no objection to this. The SEF has never denied that the ARATS attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal to its letter dated November 16. Afterwards, the ARATS and the SEF both believed they had reached a consensus through their consultations. The content of the above two paragraphs constitute the consensus reached through consultations and mutual recognition by the ARATS and the SEF in 1992. The consensus consisted of both the ARATS and the SEF clarifying their basic attitude of “striving for national reunification” and that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.” With regard to the political implications of “one China,” the SEF stated that the two sides had “different understandings,” and ARATS stated that this “was not the concern of routine talks,” and that both sides were seeking common ground while reserving differences. Although the 1992 Consensus was expressed verbally, there are clear documents and written records of it, and it is undeniable by any person or political force. There are also clear records of the situation leading to the 1992 Consensus in the form of Taiwan media reports and SEF files from that time. On August 12, 1993, the minutes from the “Wang-Koo talks” (between Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu) were published by the SEF, which clearly showed that both the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed on the one-China principle and to begin to actively consider it at the talks. The process that led to the 1992 Consensus proves that it was expressed verbally by each side, that the content expressed by both sides was mutually agreed upon, rather than being unfettered and unilateral statements, and that the core of the 1992 Consensus was that both sides adhered to the one-China principle. On the basis of expressing both sides’ adherence to the one-China policy, the 1992 Consensus took account of the interests of both sides, set aside the dispute over the political meaning of “one China,” used flexible means to seek common ground while reserving differences, reflected the political wisdom of Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and was highly significant in establishing a basis for discussions and mutual trust. First of all, the heart and soul of the consensus was that both sides expressed their adherence to the one-China principle. Indeed, consensus could not have been reached without recognizing the one-China principle. Second, with both sides adhering to the one-China principle, they were able to set aside certain political differences, such as their differing views on the political meaning of “one China,” in the spirit of equal consultation and with a pragmatic attitude of seeking common ground while reserving differences. Had it not been for this, it would have been very difficult to reach a consensus. Third, the method of expressing consensus was flexible, with each side able to express it verbally. In the 1992 Consensus, it was on the basis of both sides adhering to the one-China principle that they temporarily agreed not to discuss the political implications of “one China” and were able to hold pragmatic talks and negotiations aimed at developing cross-Strait relations in the future. It could be said that the 1992 Consensus serves as a model for temporarily putting aside political differences on the basis of the one-China principle. The mainland valued this historical experience and hard-won achievement, and compatriots on both sides of the Strait should safeguard the political foundation established by the talks between the ARATS and the SEF. On January 8, 1992, shortly after it was established, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF’s chairman, vice-chairman and secretary general inviting them to visit the mainland to exchange views on matters relating to contact and cooperation between the two sides. In its reply, the SEF expressed its willingness to arrange the “special visit for a mutually convenient time.” On August 4, ARATS’s president, Wang Daohan, sent another letter to the SEF’s chairman, Koo Chen-fu, inviting him to choose a date and time that year “to exchange views and negotiate plans on the issues of current economic development and both committees’ affairs,” and for the people in charge of the committees to talk. On August 22, Koo Chen-fu replied accepting the invitation and proposed the talks be held in Singapore. In its reply on September 30, the ARATS welcomed the invitation and suggested relevant personnel from both sides hold preparatory discussions in Beijing or another location on the mainland. In November, the 1992 Consensus, which was reached after the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed that both sides would adhere to the one-China principle, established the political basis for discussions between the two sides and created the necessary conditions for the Wang-Koo talks. In order to ensure the success of talks between the leaders of the two committees, the ARATS sent numerous letters to the SEF, inviting the responsible members of the SEF to Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks. Between March 25 and 27, 1993, the two committees held their third set of working-level talks to prepare for the preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks, and to reach consensus on draft agreements regarding verifying cross-Strait notarized documents and a cross-Strait registered mail service. From April 8 to April 11, leaders of the two committees met in Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions for the Wang-Koo talks on issues such as time, location, personnel, topics and other issues. During the preparatory discussions, the Wang-Koo talks were designated as a summit on civil, economic, functional and routine affairs, and scheduled for April 27-28. With regard to the location, the ARATS took into account the fact that Koo Chen-fu was prohibited by relevant regulations of the Taiwan authorities from traveling to the mainland and agreed to his request that the talks be held in Singapore. During the preparatory discussions, leaders from both committees initialed the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.” Afterwards, the Wang-Koo talks began. On April 27, 1993, at 10am, the Wang-Koo talks, which had attracted worldwide attention, formally began at the Neptune Orient Line Building in Singapore. During the talks, the ARATS actively advocated cross-Strait economic cooperation and suggested that cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation should be given greatest prominence in cross-Strait relations in the current stage, and that political differences should not impede economic cooperation; proposed that establishing direct mail, transport and trade links (the Three Links) between the two sides should be placed at the top of the agenda; and put forward specific recommendations for cooperation in the areas of labor services, the development of Pudong and the Three Gorges, energy and resource development, and science and technology, as well as for joint preparations for convening non-governmental economic exchange meetings. The atmosphere at the talks was good and progress was smooth, with some positive results achieved. An important consensus was reached on the issue of cross-Strait economic exchanges which stated that, “Both sides believe they should strengthen cross-Strait economic exchanges for complimentary and mutual benefit,” and decided to select a time and place to continue talks about protecting the rights and interests of Taiwan businesspeople who invest on the mainland, cross-Strait industrial and commercial personnel visits and other issues, and to discuss strengthening energy and resource development and exchanges. On the issue of cross-Strait science and technology exchanges, both sides agreed to promote visits by scientific and technological personnel, exchange scientific and technological research publications, look into unifying scientific and technological terminology and standardizing product specifications, and jointly promote exchanges in computing and other industrial science and technology. In terms of cultural and educational exchanges, both sides further agreed on specific projects for youth and news media exchanges. The ARATS and SEF also agreed to establish a system of contacts and talks, including both sides giving special clearance for appropriate personnel from the two committees to travel between Taiwan and the mainland. In the afternoon of April 29, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu signed the “Wang-Koo talks Joint Agreement,” “Cross-Strait Agreement on a System of Contacts and Talks,” “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.” The Wang-Koo talks attracted widespread attention from Taiwan society as well as the international media, and more than 300 journalists covered the talks, including 100 journalists from Taiwan and the mainland. The major news agencies from the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK also covered the talks in-depth. The Wang-Koo talks were the highest level non-governmental cross-Strait talks held by high level individuals since 1949, and their influence far exceeded their results. Jiang Zemin pointed out that, “The Wang-Koo talks were successful and achieved results, and it marks a historic step forward in cross-Strait relations.” He also stated that, “The reason the Wang-Koo talks was successful is because it reflected the wish of compatriots on both sides of the Strait, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and the vast number of overseas Chinese for cross-Strait contact and discussions, cooperation, economic development and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The Taiwan side felt that the summit “was the first step in establishing cross-Strait contact” and “a milestone in institutionalizing cross-Strait civilian exchanges,” as well as “a major key to developing cross-Strait relations from confrontation to peaceful reunification over the past half century.” The Wang-Koo talks had far-reaching historical significance for cross-Strait contact and negotiations, and even for the development of cross-Strait relations. First of all, the Wang-Koo talks established an institutionalized cross-Strait negotiation mechanism on the basis of the one-China principle; had a large impact on the Taiwan authorities’ “three noes policy” of no contact, no compromise and no negotiations; and made negotiations a fact and idea generally accepted by Taiwan compatriots. By adhering to the one-China principle, both sides could carry out negotiations on an equal footing, and through cross-Strait negotiations, cross-Strait relations stabilized and developed. Second, the Wang-Koo talks established a model for cross-Strait consultations on an equal footing on the basis of the one-China principle. The Wang-Koo talks embodied the ARATS and the SEF’s spirit of mutual respect, seeking truth from facts, carrying out negotiations on an equal footing and seeking common ground while reserving differences. The talks proved that pragmatic and equal negotiations based on adherence to the one-China principle do not, as the Taiwan authorities put it, “dwarf” Taiwan. They proved that on the basis of the one-China principle, political differences can be temporarily put aside, issues relating to cross-Strait relations can be resolved by seeking common ground while reserving differences, and mutual trust can be enhanced and consensuses reached. They also proved that, on the basis of the one-China principle, Chinese people on both sides of the Strait are entirely capable of finding a suitable way to conduct bilateral negotiations on an equal footing. Third, the Wang-Koo talks and their outcome provided a strong impetus for the development of cross-Strait economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and they strengthened the Chinese national identity of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. The Wang-Koo talks were the result of the flourishing development of economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and were the concentrated expression of intense national sentiment and desire for contact, exchanges and cooperation on the part of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. During the Wang-Koo talks, the spirit and content advocated by the mainland side of strengthening economic cooperation and developing common national interests has not only provided strong impetus to developing economic exchanges and cooperation over the past twenty years, but still has practical significance for improving and developing cross-Straits relations today.
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