TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE IS HARMFUL TO THE NATION AND A MENACE TO THE STATE

　　2. Attempts at Separation: From the July 8th Incident to Tibet’s Peaceful Liberation

　　On July 8, 1949, on the eve of the PLA’s victory in the Chinese revolution, elements of the Tibetan leadership accelerated their split from the motherland, which precipitated an unprecedented crisis in relations between the Tibetan local government and the Chinese central government. Officials from the governing council of Tibet – the Kashag – suddenly informed the Nationalist government acting representative in Tibet, Chen Xizhang, that the Tibetan People’s General Assembly had decided to temporarily sever relations between the Tibetan and Nationalist governments but retain religious ties, and to order staff of representative offices and other organs to depart Tibet for India within two weeks. The Kashag also sent troops to destroy the Nationalist government’s broadcasting station in Lhasa, which effectively cut off all communication with the mainland and put an end to postal exchanges. The Kashag then drafted the Declaration of Independence of Tibet and readied a delegation to be dispatched to the United Nations to request assistance, while international anti-China forces began rallying support for their cause.

　　In view of the situation, Chairman Mao issued instructions that the PLA should enter Tibet sooner rather than later. As the PLA prepared to march into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche, who led a small group of separatists in the Tibetan local government, ignored the CPC central government’s advances without thought for future and destiny of the Tibetan people, and set about achieving Tibetan independence. In an effort to delay the PLA’s entry into Tibet, the Taktra Rinpoche absurdly requested “peaceful negotiations” in Hong Kong between Tibetan “diplomatic representatives” and the central government to discuss the relationship between the “two countries.” He also dispatched representatives to foreign countries in the hope of garnering international assistance for Tibetan independence forces. With the help of the British government in India’s trade representative in Lhasa, Hugh Edward Richardson, and the American Lowell Thomas, a “goodwill mission” from Tibet traveled to the United States, Britain, India, Nepal and other countries to request assistance.

　　Despite the disruptive behavior of the Tibetan local government, the Chinese central government was determined not to give up on its efforts to peacefully liberate Tibet in order to strengthen unity between the Han and Tibetan peoples and safeguard social stability in the region. In preparation, Deng Xiaoping drafted a policy concerning the ten conditions on which the central government would hold negotiations with the local government in Tibet based on the principles of national unity and ethnic equality. In order to communicate the policy, the Central People’s Broadcasting Station put on a special broadcast in Tibetan of China’s interim constitution called the Common Program, the central government’s ten conditions for holding negotiations with the Tibetan side, and a related editorial by the Xinhua News Agency, all of which served to expose the imperialist conspiracy and illustrated the central government’s concern for Tibet. Geshe Sherab Gyatso and other patriots appealed to the Dalai Lama not to be taken in by imperialist lies and to send representatives to Beijing for negotiations on how to solve the Tibetan question. Moreover, the central government put together a group of religious patriots who arranged for the Gedar Tulku to travel to Tibet from Ganzi in Sichuan to do the Dalai Lama’s work. Despite the central government continuing to seek a peaceful resolution and urging the Tibetan side to negotiate, on October 6, the Battle of Qamdo began. After 18 days of fighting, the political and economic center of eastern Tibet and vast areas around the city were liberated, which opened the door for PLA forces to enter Tibet and crush the armed resistance of imperialist and pro-imperialist separatist forces. The victory also caused cracks to appear in the unity of the Tibetan side and paved the way for Tibet’s peaceful liberation.

　　The PLA’s victory at the Battle of Qamdo came as a great shock to Tibet’s ruling class. Kashag officials and the abbots of Lhasa’s three great monasteries urgently called a meeting to discuss their next move. Pro-imperialist separatists urged the Indian government to intervene, and put together a plan to seize the Dalai Lama and take him to India. However, the Galoin and representatives of Lhasa’s three great monasteries opposed the separatists’ actions and advocated suing for peace with the central government. At loggerheads, the two sides asked the Dharma Protectors to intervene, who instructed that the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, should be aloud to assume the reins of government. On November 17, 1950, the Chikamasa ceremony was held for the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, which meant at the age of only 17 the Dalai Lama assumed supreme power of Tibet’s political and religious affairs. But coerced by certain Kashag officials and tulkus, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa for neighboring India. With Britain, the United States and India remaining neutral on the issue of Tibet, and having failed to garner international support following an appeal to the United Nations for assistance in preventing a Chinese “invasion” after the Kashag declared Tibetan independence, the Kashag and the Dalai Lama were left weighing up their options, and eventually decided to send a delegation of officials, including Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, to negotiate with Beijing in the first step towards the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

　　On April 29, 1951, negotiations concerning the peaceful liberation of Tibet began. Following frank discussions and negotiations, both sides produced the famous 17-point “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” .There were three main aspects to the provisions of the agreement: First, the Tibetan people would return to motherland; the Tibetan government would actively assist the PLA enter Tibet and guard Tibet’s borders; the Tibetan government would submit itself to the unified authority of the central government; the central government would set up a Military and Political Committee and a military command post in Tibet; and other than personnel sent by the central government, as many Tibetans as possible would be used to carry out the government’s work in Tibet. Second, the central government would not change the existing political system in Tibet or the status, function and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama; the central government would also safeguard and respect the religious freedoms of the Tibetan people and not interfere with the incomes of monasteries. Third, Tibet would become an autonomous region; Tibetan language and script as well as school education would gradually be developed as well as agriculture, livestock breeding, industries and commerce in order to improve the people’s lives. The central government also promised not to force any of the above reforms on the local population. The agreement stated that the local government in Tibet would implement the reforms, and when people sought reform they would consult with Tibetan leaders to work out solutions. 

　　After signing the agreement, Chairman Mao cordially received representatives from Tibet in Huairen Hall, where a grand banquet was held to celebrate the signing of the agreement. The central people’s government also dispatched their representative to Tibet, Zhang Jingwu, via Hong Kong and India to meet with the Dalai Lama and personally hand him a copy of the agreement and a personal letter from Mao Zedong, as well as explain in detail the CPC’s policies on ethnic minorities and religion. When the PLA peacefully liberated Tibet, it brought an end to Tibet’s modern history of imperialist and colonial aggression and laid a solid foundation for the great causes of China’s unification and national unity, allowing the Tibetan people to set out on the bright path of unity, progress and development.

　　3. The Farcical Escape: From the Pseudo-People’s Assembly to the Armed Rebellion

　　After the 17-point agreement had been signed, the separatist activities of some Tibetans intensified, with a small number of separatists, led by Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi, who opposed the agreement, attempting to block food supplies to the newly-arrived PLA in an effort to starve them out of Tibet. With the support of reactionary Tibetan leaders, some merchants as well as abbots and monks who opposed the reunification of the motherland, established a reactionary “Peoples Assembly”, which demanded that the PLA leave Tibet and organized activities in violation of the 17-point agreement in order to destroy Han-Tibetan unity and split the motherland. They even secretly formed a Tibetan army and surrounded the offices of the central government’s representative in Lhasa and the local working committee and organized armed riots in the streets of Lhasa.

　　Although the pseudo-People’s Assembly’s conspiracy did not succeed due to the political struggle waged by the central government and the PLA’s strong military presence, the incident was a preview of the rebellion being plotted by reactionary Tibetan leaders. Afterwards some of those involved went into hiding to conduct their illegal activities in secret. Lukhangwa used the excuse of going on a pilgrimage to India to travel to Kalimpong, which had by then become the headquarters of opposition to the motherland and Tibetan independence activities. Led by Tsepon Shakabpa, the traitors met with people from the UK, the US, Taiwan and other European countries, including a number of foreign spies, and accepted money and weapons from them, which they smuggled into Tibet for independence activities.

　　It is worth noting the Dalai Lama’s attitude towards the Tibetan separatist and patriotic forces, and his changing attitude toward the central government. After Tibet was peacefully liberated , the Dalai Lama supported some of the reforms being implemented in Tibet. In 1945, the Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing to attend the first meeting of the first session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and was elected Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. In 1955, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa where he wrote a song praising Chairman Mao, in which he compared him to the sun and a loving mother, and praised him for liberating Tibet and illuminating the path to peace. In 1956, a Central Committee delegation led by Marshal Chen Yi arrived in Lhasa to attend the forthcoming General Assembly of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, at which the Dalai Lama was elected Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Panchen Lama was elected First Vice Chairman. Following his nomination, the young Dalai Lama enthusiastically participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee.

　　But under the coercion of Tibetan separatist forces who controlled the Kashag government, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama did not continue in that vain, instead veering onto the path of Tibetan independence. Following the Dalai Lama’s attendance at the NPC session, under the guise of going to greet the Dalai Lama on his return, five members of the pseudo-People’s Assembly traveled to Ya’an and Kangding in the former province of Xikang to engage in conspiratorial activities and wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama in which they openly opposed the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region and requested that Tibet declare independence. In 1956, a rebellion broke out in Ganzi in Sichuan Province, and the Dalai Lama’s adjutant, Phala Thupten, gave orders to make contact with the armed rebels and to transport weapons and ammunition to them disguised as a trade caravan. As the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region was being established, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Losang Samten, summoned the head of Jomda County and announced, “Qamdo Prefecture must act in accordance with the area east of the river (referring to the armed rebellion east of the Jinsha River). This is the order of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.” On November 22, 1956, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were invited to India for the 2500-year anniversary of Sakyamuni’s nirvana. As soon as he arrived in India, the Dalai Lama strengthened his relations with Tsepon Shakabpa, Gyalo Dhondup and Western anti-China forces, and even thought about not returning to Tibet. However, the Panchen Lama returned to Tibet as scheduled on January 29, 1957, which disrupted the Dalai Lama separatist clique’s plans due to concerns that if the Dalai Lama did not return to Tibet power would fall into the hands of others. He therefore had no choice but to return to Lhasa and work on his plans further.

　　In early 1959, with the support and planning of Tibet’s reactionary leaders, the armed rebellion intensified and spread to rural areas of Tibet. The insurgents took advantage of the scattered locations of Chinese forces and organs to not only rob road maintenance crews, attack military depots, ambush vehicles, blow up bridges and render roads impassible, but also constantly besiege PLA troops and government organizations. Tibet’s reactionary leaders were keen to launch an all-out armed rebellion but needed an excuse that would fool the masses and fan the flames of rebellion. They therefore decided to use the Dalai Lama’s visit to the military command area to watch an opera performance on March 10 to openly break the 17-point agreement, betray the motherland and launch a full-scale armed rebellion. On March 10, local government reactionaries Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi began spreading unfounded rumors that the Han Chinese wanted to kidnap the Dalai Lama and encouraged people to travel to Norbulingka to petition the Dalai Lama not to travel. They also told the Dalai Lama that the event he had been invited to by the PLA was a ruse and that they actually intended to capture him. Using the excuse that they wished to protect the Dalai Lama from harm, they then kept the Dalai Lama locked in his residence surrounded by Tibetan soldiers. The reactionaries then convened a so-called “People’s Congress”, at which they decided to split with the Chinese central government and fight to the end for Tibetan independence. Between March 11 and 13, the leaders of the rebellion convened the “People’s Congress” to organize the expansion of the armed rebellion. The leaders also threatened Tibetan cadres, teachers, students and people working for organs related to the Preparatory Committee for the Founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, demanding that they join the cause of Tibetan independence, and forced monks and lay people alike to join the rebellion. The leaders of the rebellion also held a so-called “Tibetan Independence People’s Assembly” ,during which they publicly tore up the 17-point agreement, declared Tibetan independence, and betrayed the motherland by launching an armed rebellion.

　　After the full-scale armed rebellion was launched, the CPC Central Committee and Chairman analyzed the situation in Tibet and issued specific instructions on the political and military measures that should be taken by the CPC Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command. Militarily, based on the principles of not firing first and fighting only in self-defense, the Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District Command prepared a plan for mobile operations. Politically, the truth about the reactionary clique who had incited the rebellion was widely publicized through various forms of communication. Work was also carried out to unite people in positions of power in Tibet against the rebellion and in support of national unification. While the Dalai Lama was being controlled by rebels in Norbulingka, making contact with him proved extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the Tibet Work Committee managed to get three letters through to him from Beijing’s acting representative in Tibet, Tan Guansan, with the help of those still loyal to the motherland. In the letters, Tan Guansan sympathized with the Dalai Lama’s plight and expressed concern for his safety. He also pointed out that reactionaries were flagrantly and arrogantly provoking a military confrontation, and demanded that the local government put an end to such actions immediately. However, the reactionary leaders in Tibet ignored the central government’s warning and continued to carry out rebellious acts and finalize their plans for fleeing Tibet. On the night of March 17, the Dalai Lama and others crossed the Lhasa River and escaped into Lhoka Prefecture. On March 21, the Dalai Lama arrived in Lhunzhe County, which he proclaimed to be second capital of Tibet and appointed Andrug Gompo Tashi the commander in charge of Lhoka Prefecture’s army. The Dalai Lama then fled to India, from where he issued a statement calling for Tibetan independence. On June 20, the Dalai Lama held his first public press conference and claimed that he wanted Tibet to enjoy the autonomy and independent status it had enjoyed prior to the Chinese invasion in 1950. Afterwards, despite the fact the Chinese adopted a patient attitude and held open his post of Vice Chairman of the NPC until December 1964, he decided to take up long-term residence in India and went on to set up a “government in exile”, concoct a so-called “Tibetan Constitution” ,advocate the concepts of a “middle way” and “Greater Tibet” ,and engage in activities aimed at splitting the motherland and undermining national unity. He walked further and further down the wrong path to become the leader of the separatist political group behind the Tibetan independence conspiracy, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the source of social unrest in Tibet and the greatest obstacle to achieving normal order in the region. (To be continued) 

　　 (孙显辉 译)